DA PAMPHLET 550-9 COMMUNIST CHINA A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY 1971 EDITION, HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY。WASHINGTON, D.C. | Black Water Museum Collection
BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEYS OF OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD
The Army Library, Administrative Services Directorate, The Adjutant General's Office, has issued in recent years a series of bibliographic surveys of literature, all of which have been the products of in-house research.
Below is a current list of bibliographic surveys
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO: Analytical Survey of Literature, January 1970, DA PAM 50-1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: Analytical Survey of Literature-1969 Edition, February 1969, DA PAM 550-7
USSR: Strategic Survey; A Bibliography, 1969 Edition, January 1969, DA PAM 550-6
MIDDLE EAST: Tricontinental Hub; A Bibliographic Survey, Volume II, April 1968, DA PAM 550-2-1
AFRICA: A Strategic Survey, April 1967, DA PAM 550-5
*SOUTH ASIA: A Strategic Survey, September 1966, DA PAM 550-3
COMMUNIST CHINA: A Strategic Survey, February 1966, DA PAM 20-67
*Not on sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. All others ARE on sale
"The More We Sweat In Peace The Less We Bleed In War" -Chinese Proverb (平時多流汗，戰時少留血 - 中國諺語)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
This pamphlet of bibliographic material on Communist China has been compiled by research analysts of the US Army Library in response to a continuing need for sources of current in formation on that country. The last edition was published in February 1966. Since that date, many significant events in and related to Communist China focus the attention of the world on that area and highlight its importance not only to the affairs of Asia but to the rest of the world as well. The Cultural Revolution which first became public in the spring of 1966, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border dispute and the continuing involvement of mainland China in the affairs of countries on its periphery illustrate the complexity and the far ranging impact that these regional problems have on other countries of the world. A fuller comprehension of what is taking place within China today is important if we are to deal intelligently with that nation state in the future.
The bibliographic information provided includes a wide range of source material on a number of subjects which are keys to a knowledge of the region and its peoples. Hopefully, in creased knowledge will lead to a better understanding of the complex events taking place within China and within Asia.
RICHARD G. STILLWELL
Lieutenant general, GS Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
This unclassified bibliographic survey was prepared at the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, United States Army. It up dates DA PAM 20-67 which was published in February 1966 and endeavors to shed light on Communist China in its internal and external image during the intervening years.
For the most part, the materials included in this pamphlet are available in the open holdings of The Army Library, Pentagon. The 800 abstracts in cluded in the publication were selected from several thousand periodical articles, books, studies, and reports, both friendly and unfriendly. No effort has been made to delete or exclude references by reason of their controversial nature. On the other hand, inclusion of entries does not represent an official endorsement of the views expressed.
The information appearing in the abstracts is supported by appendixes com prised of charts, tables, and 17 maps of military, political, economic, and sociological nature.
The research analysts gratefully acknowledge the assistance and coopera tion of the specialists in the various Federal Agencies. Special appreciation is extended to: Presentations, Staff Management Division, Office, Chief of Staff, for art work and graphics support; the Central Intelligence Agency for pro viding the colorful maps of China; the U.S. Army Topographic Command for the two outstanding maps of Southern Asia and Southeastern Asia; and to the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, for permission to use excerpts and statistical data from its publications.
COMMUNIST CHINA: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY
GLOBAL AMBITIONS AND OBJECTIVES
A. Communist China's Strategy for Revolu tionary Warfare (See also Appendix 0)
THE AFRO-ASIAN OCEAN HEART LAND: A STUDY, by Rocco M. Paone, in Ma rine Corps Gazette, v.50, no.1 (January 1966) 21-26.
"The author advances a seldom-reported reason why we must fulfill our commitment in Southeast Asia; that a Viet Cong victory in Viet Nam is really only a limited objective for Com munist China." Under discussion: The dynamic significance of the Afro-Asian ocean heartland; Communist China's interest in the Afro-Asian ocean heartland; implementation of United States and Western policy; a multinational strike force; some basic international considerations (in formulating any geopolitical concept for this area). Concludes: "The concept of an Afro Asian Ocean Heartland, implemented by a multi national carrier based nuclear deterrent, is posi tive and bold and fits the requirements of con temporary and near future policy of the United States and the West as well. This heartland, in cluding as it does one of the most important sea areas of the world, is vital to the security of the West, and must be protected against the aggres sive policy of the Communist Chinese govern ment in that region of the world, if the United States is to remain the leader of Western diplo macy. Within this frame of thought then, the present strife in Viet-Nam offers a much greater challenge than the independence of South Viet Nam; it involves the concept of autonomy for the whole of the Afro-Asian Ocean region of the world. Supremacy in this area is the ultimate objective of the present Communist Chinese gov
ernment and the achievement of this aim must be denied by the United States." With map showing Afro-Asian area of the world within which 90% of the world's rubber, 60% of all uranium-plus one-fifth of US trade is comprised.
THE ASSAULT ON THE WEST, by Ian Greig. Surrey, England, 1968. 357 p.
"Mr. Greig has made a special study of Communist political warfare techniques. His aim in this work is to present a general survey of the strategy and tactics employed by Interna tional Communism in its bid for world domina tion during the last 20 years. In THE AS SAULT ON THE WEST he gives many new facts about the global nature of Communist bloc propaganda activities [including that of Com munist China], foreign broadcasts, news agencies, international front organisations, espionage, sub version, Communist Parties and their methods and finally Communist terrorism and guerilla warfare. The information presented is thorough ly documented and has been drawn from Com munist policy statements, official reports of West ern Governments and the statements of defectors who actually took part in the events described. The author believes that despite the occurrence of the Sino-Soviet split and other changes which have taken place in the Communist world in re cent years, the threat posed by the Communist assault on the West is increasing in scope and in tensity rather than decreasing. Rejecting the view that the Cold War is over or as one national newspaper put it that 'the world conspiracy of Communism is dying its natural death,' the author points out that the main thrust of the Communist offensive is now being centered upon attempts to
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ADIVE BU RELATED DATA: 1967 INCLUDING BOTH CHINAS
-MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND RELATED DATA: 1967-
APPENDIX S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BACKGROUND NOTES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE APRIL 1969 REPUBLIC OF CHINA BACKGROUND NOTES
Population: 13.7 million (est.)
Taiwan (Formosa), the seat of the Government of the Republic of China (G.R.C.) since 1949, is an island 90 miles off the southeast coast of the Chinese mainland. It and the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands lying to the west are administered as the Province of Taiwan.
Taiwan itself roughly resembles a tobacco leaf in shape and is about 240 miles long and 60 to 90 miles wide. The island, with a total area of about 14,000 square miles, is about the size of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island combined. A north-south mountain range forms the backbone of the island, with the highest peak, Mt. Morrison or Yu Shan, rising to 13,100 feet. The eastern slope of this range is exceedingly steep and craggy, but the western half of the island is generally flat, fertile, and well-cultivated, yielding two and, in the southernmost regions, three rice crops each year. The principal harbors are Keelung (Chi-lung) and Kao-hsiung. The "offshore islands" held by the Republic
of China consist of two principal island groups close to the mainland-Kinmen (Quemoy) off Amoy and Matsu off Foochow-plus a few minor islands. The Tropic of Cancer bisects Taiwan slightly south of its midpoint. The climate is semitropical. The island is in the so-called earthquake and ty phoon belts and suffers periodic damage from vio lent rains, floods, winds, and tremors.
The Chinese flag consists of a red field with a white sun in a blue rectangle in the upper left corner. The sun symbolizes the Kuomintang Party; the 12 rays, progressive spirit, Red, white, and blue bespeak sacrifice, justice, and fraternity.
Taiwan has a population of more than 13.5 million; the Pescadores population of about 100,000; and the offshore islands a total of approximately 70,000 inhabitants, excluding the military. The death rate of less than .6 percent is one of the world's lowest; the rate of population growth, now about 2.3 percent a year, has de clined steadily for the last several years from one of the highest in the world.
The Taiwanese, with the exception of about 150,000 aborigines believed to be related to aboriginal tribes in the Philippines, are descendants of Chinese who migrated from the crowded coastal areas of Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces within the last 300 years. The approximately 1.5 million mainlanders who arrived in Taiwan in 1949 and 1950 came from all parts of China.
The peculiarly Chinese combination of Buddhism and Taoism, imported into Taiwan centuries ago with the original Chinese settlers of the island, is the predominant religion. A thin scattering of Moslems was introduced with the movement of refugees from the mainland after the Communist victory there in 1949. Christian missionaries have been active in Taiwan since before the Japanese occupation, and there are now-roughly 400,000 practicing Christians among the local population.
More than 80 percent of the inhabitants of Taiwan are literate. Native Taiwanese speak a variant of the Amoy dialect, although Hakka dialect is spoken in the rural districts of two north western counties (Hsinchu and Miaoli) and in small enclaves in the southern and eastern districts. An increasing number of people speak Mandarin, the official Chinese dialect, which now is taught in all schools. Most adult Taiwanese also speak Japanese as a result of 50 years of Japanese rule; and nearly every dialect of China is rep resented among the mainland Chinese of the island.
According to Chinese sources there had been some Chinese migration to Taiwan as early as the 6th century. The major influx, however, took place during and after the 17th century from the Chinese mainland Provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung. From 1624 to 1661, the Dutch held a base on Taiwan, but they were driven out by Koxinga (CHENG Cheng-kung), who used the island as a base in his attempt to defeat the Manchus and restore the Ming Dynasty. The Manchus conquered the island in 1683, and the Chinese exercised sovereignty over the island until 1895, when it was ceded to Japan following the Sino-Japanese War.
At the end of World War II in 1945, the Chinese Government received the surrender of the Japanese forces on Taiwan, and the Chinese Government has administered the island since that time. The Chinese Government established its capital at Taipei in December 1949, following the Communist conquest of the mainland. In the peace treaty of 1952, the Japanese renounced any claim to Taiwan and the Pescadores.
The Government of the Republic of China moved to Taipei on December 8, 1949. Chiang Kai-shek has been President of the Republic of China since 1948, except for a brief period of semiretirement in 1949. He has been the Republic's fore most statesman and military leader since 1927.
Under the Republic's Constitution adopted in 1947 the sovereignty of the people is exercised by the National Assembly, which elects the President and Vice President. The present National Assembly was elected in 1947 on a territorial and professional basis. (Its term was for 6 years, but the Constitution has been in terpreted broadly in view of the present im possibility of conducting elections on the main land.) At the time of the election the number of seats in the Assembly was 3,045, but less than half of the seats now are filled. However, the Constitution has been interpreted so that a quorum is defined as a fraction of those members able to attend an Assembly session instead of a fraction of the original membership. In addition to electing the President and Vice President, the Assembly has the power to amend the Constitution and the powers, as yet not exercised, of initiative and referendum.
The President stands above the five branches of the Government (the Five Yuans). He is assisted by the Office of the President, which is headed by a Secretary-General; and he appoints the Pre- mier, with the consent of the Legislative Yuan. The Premier is the President of the Executive Yuan (or Cabinet) and is responsible for policy and administration. The main legislative organ is the Legislative Yuan, originally with 773 seats; less than 400 members now attend the sessions. The other elected branch is the Control Yuan, which checks on the efficiency and honesty of the Government. There are only about 80 members now, compared to about 180 in 1949, the year its number was at a maximum. The Examination Yuan has functions similar to those of our Civil Service Commission. The Judicial Yuan includes a 17-man Council of Grand Justices, which func tions like our Supreme Court, to interpret the Constitution.
The top local government organ is the Taiwan Provincial Government. Its chief executive, the Governor, is appointed by the national Gov ernment. There is an elective Provincial As sembly with limited powers.
The political situation in the Republic of China remains stable. There has been relatively little change in the top policy positions of the Gov ernment under the leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek, inaugurated for his fourth 6-year term on May 20, 1966. Also inaugurated in 1966 was Vice President Yen Chia-kan who serves concur rently as Premier, a position he has held since 1963. Chiang Ching-kuo, elder son of the President, is Minister of National Defense and has increasingly attained a position of pre eminence within the Government and the ruling political party.
Friction between native Taiwanese, most of whom came from the Chinese mainland in the 17th century, and the Chinese, who came from the mainland between 1945 and 1949, constituted a serious problem in the early years after the Japanese surrender but is slowly diminishing. Although Taiwanese do not play an important role in the national Government, they hold most of the elective and appointive positions at the pro vincial and local levels. Taiwanese are mayors of all five cities, county magistrates of 15 of the 16 counties, and occupants of most of the seats in the Provincial Assembly.
The Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist Party is the principal political party and enjoys a ma jority in all political bodies-national, provincial, and local. There are two minor political parties but neither exercises any important influence. Successful non-KMT candidates in local elections have generally run as independents although the present mayor of Kao-hsiung is a member of the Democratic Socialist Party. While the Govern ment maintains strict security measures in its vigil against any possible subversion from the Communist Chinese mainland, there is a consider able amount of political liberty on local issues, as reflected by the free local elections throughout Taiwan and the Pescadores.
Taiwan is moving rapidly from an agricultural to a predominantly industrial economy. In 1966 industrial output surpassed the value of agricul tural output and by 1968 had exceeded it by 26 percent.
Overall economic growth has been fast and sustained. In 1968 the gross national product. (GNP) in real terms increased by 10.3 percent, and during the past 10 years the increase in real terms has averaged more than 7 percent per year. GNP in 1967 was $3,539 million. Population has also been increasing but not nearly as quickly; the growth of real per capita income has averaged 5.7 percent annually, amounting to $237 in 1968.
The bulk of Taiwan's nonagricultural economic activity is concentrated in light and medium manufacturing. Expansion in these industries is proceeding at a spectacular rate. Textiles and garments, which account for some 13 percent of the value of all manufacturing, have been increasing at 10 percent per year for the past 6 years. Electrical equipment production, particularly electronic, which had been expanding more than 40 percent per year, doubled in 1968,
almost reaching the level of textile output. Production of metal and machinery has been increasing at a respectable rate of 20 percent per year and now accounts for about 8 percent of the total value of all manufactured goods.
The growth of other manufacturing industries has been extensive in recent years and presently includes the production of plywood, fertilizers, petrochemicals, cement, plastics, and glass. The development of heavier industry is now being con sidered. Electric power capacity has been greatly expanded but has been hard put to keep pace with growing demands. Water power sites are almost exhausted and nuclear as well as new thermal plants are planned.
Agriculture, still an important sector of the economy, is more intensive on Taiwan than in any other country in the world, with the exception of Japan. Although only one-fourth of the land is arable, virtually all of it is cultivated and most produces two or three crops per year.
The two most important crops are rice and sugar. The 1968 rice crop amounted to about 2.5 million tons. As the staple food of the population, it is largely consumed domestically, but until recently there were substantial exports to Japan. Sugar, unlike rice, is a major export crop and until 1965 was Taiwan's largest earner of foreign exchange. Textiles are now the major export but, because of diversification, account for less than 15 percent of the total. Exports in 1968 were approximately 1 million tons. Additional export crops include bananas, mushrooms, tea, and asparagus.
Other important crops, essentially for do mestic consumption, are sweet potatoes, tobacco, peanuts, soybeans, and cassava. Pigs and poultry are significant livestock items.
Fisheries, particularly deep sea fishing, are expanding rapidly. With the catch doubling over the past 10 years, the fishing industry makes a significant contribution to the diet and to the
export earnings of Taiwan.
The agricultural sector has become increas ingly flexible in the last few years in finding new demands and growing new crops to meet them.
The Republic of China's trade is expanding to keep pace with industrial growth. The increase has been from 10-30 percent each year for the past 6 years. Exports jumped 22 percent in 1968 to $843 million. The increase in imports slowed from 35 and 40 percent in 1966 and 1967 to 11 percent in 1968 when they totaled $976 million. With the buildup of industry, imports of capital goods have risen steadily over the past 15 years and now account for nearly 40 percent of total imports, while importation of raw materials has declined to 55 percent and consumer goods to 7 percent. Beginning in 1966, exports of industrial products exceeded the value of both processed and unprocessed agricultural products as the latter are gradually declining in relative importance, although rising in dollar value.
For 15 years, from 1950 to 1965, the United States assisted the Chinese in their determined efforts to rehabilitate and strengthen their econ omy. The hard work of the Chinese people, supplemented by $1.5 billion in economic and tech nical assistance from the United States, had dramatic results.
During the last 10 years of the assistance program (1956-65) China's gross national product increased at an average annual rate of 7.7 per cent. Over the same period per capita income increased 4.3 percent annually and industrial production more than trebled. Farmers also shared in the extraordinary growth through the expansion of agricultural production at the rate of 6.1 percent annually during the 10-year period.
In July 1965, AID announced the termination of its assistance program. However, certain other U.S. Government programs, including the shipment of surplus agricultural commodities, have continued.
The Military Assistance Program has also continued, although at reduced levels made possible by the increased ability of the Chinese to finance their own defense requirements.
One of the Government's chief policy concerns in the field of foreign relations has been the preservation and strengthening of its international position. The G.R.C. has followed an active foreign policy in support of its position, an important feature of which is a highly successful aid program, called Vanguard, carried on principally in Africa but also extending to some Asian and Latin American countries.
Although the G.R.C. has undertaken some small nonagricultural technical assistance projects, its main emphasis under the Vanguard program has been on agricultural demonstration and extension, particularly in rice culture. This has involved the sending of Chinese teams to recipient countries and programs in Taiwan for trainees from those countries. Prior to 1965 the G.R.C. had allocated approximately $1 million to the Vanguard program. The budget has since in creased rapidly and in 1967 exceeded $5 million. In order to encourage and cooperate with the G.R.C. in a further expansion of this successful program, the United States agreed to commit over a 2-year period up to half of the local currency generated by the sale of surplus agricultural
commodities to the G.R.C. under the Public Law 480 agreement signed on December 12, 1967. This U.S. contribution would not exceed $18,750,000, and the G.R.C. would commit not less than $6,250,000.
In addition to being a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the G.R.C. participates in several U.N. specialized agencies. An important aspect of its foreign policy has been its position in the United Nations. Except in 1964, the right of the G.R.C. to represent China in the United Nations has been challenged each year since 1950. In 1961 the so-called Albanian resolution was pre sented. This resolution called for the seating of the Chinese Communists and the expulsion of the G.R.C. At the same time, the United States and other countries friendly to the G.R.C. introduced a resolution which would consider any change regarding the representation of China to be an "important question" requiring approval by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. The "important question" resolution has been passed on five separate occasions, and the Albanian resolution has been defeated each time it has been. presented.
In 1966 a third resolution regarding the Chinese representation issue was introduced by Italy and others. This resolution, termed the "study committee" resolution, proposed establishment of a committee to explore and study the Chinese representation question in all its aspects in order to "make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly . . . for an equitable and practical solution to the question." The United States voted for this proposal which was, however, defeated that year and in the two subsequent Assemblies.
At present, 66 countries recognize or have relations with the G.R.C.; 50 recognize or have relations with the Communist Chinese Government; two countries claim to recognize both Governments; and 15 recognize neither.
G. R. C. Participation in Regional Cooperation
Given the size of Taiwan and the comparatively recent growth of its economy, the G.R.C. already has made a notable contribution to the development of institutions and patterns of regional cooperation in East Asia. It is a member of a broad range of regional organizations, including the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), the Asian Productivity Organization (APO), the Council of Asian Labor Ministers, and the Asian Parliamentary Union. Chinese delegations have taken part in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions/Asian Regional Organization conferences, and, although not a member, G.R.C. contributions have been wel comed by the Mekong Committee (Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin).
The G.R.C. has been particularly active in assisting in the diffusion throughout East Asia of advanced agricultural techniques and services. Additionally, the G.R.C. has shared its own ex periences in land reform, light industrialization, economic diversification and development, and family planning with other countries in the region. Of possibly greater potential significance for the future of regional cooperation has been the imaginative joint planning recently undertaken by the G.R.C. and the Republic of Korea looking toward shared production and marketing of syn thetic textile raw materials. Both countries plan to extend this arrangement to other areas in which domestic markets do not justify the large scale capital investment required for production facilities.
The United States recognizes and maintains diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of China. It supports the G.R.C.'s rightful place in the United Nations and other international organizations.
Since the beginning of the Korean war it has been United States policy to assist the Chinese Government in defending Taiwan and the Pescadores against Communist attack. To carry out this mission the 7th Fleet was directed by President Truman on June 27, 1950, to repell any attack on Taiwan by the Chinese Communists. On March 3, 1955, a mutual defense treaty between the United States and China came into effect. Under the terms of this treaty the United States is committed formally to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores; by an exchange of notes pursuant to this treaty, the United States and the Republic of China agreed that use of force from the treaty area or the offshore islands would be a matter of joint agreement, except for self-defense actions of an emergency nature. Under Public Law 4, 84th Congress, the President is authorized to take such measures as he deems necessary for the protection of Formosa and the Pescadores, this authority to include the "securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be re quired or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores."
The United States is assisting the Chinese Government to strengthen the defense capabilities of its military forces. A Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) has been on Taiwan since May 1, 1951, training and reequipping the Chinese Army, Navy, and Air Force.
The United States encouraged the G.R.C. in a program of accelerated economic development, beginning in 1960, to assist in creating an example of economic vitality. The economic progress achieved in Taiwan under this program has made it possible to carry out a policy of gradually stopping concessional aid. As a result, the AID Mission, as mentioned above, closed in July 1965 with only a small residual AID staff remaining in Taipei until 1967.
APPENDIX V STRENGTH OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
COMMUNIST CHINA (People's Republic of China)
NATIONAL POLITICAL STATUS:
Before the Cultural Revolution the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the world's largest Communist Party, established in essence a one-party dictatorship, which utilized the trappings of representative and constitutional government. Its members occupied key governmental and military positions on every organizational level. In 1949 the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a united front of political parties and mass organizations, helped in the formal creation of the nation's government. This united front acted as a provisional legislative assembly until the National People's Congress was established in 1954. The NPC, composed of 2,800 members, many of whom were not CCP members, was elected indirectly from the country's various administrative regions, its armed forces, ethnic minorities and overseas Chinese. It supposedly represented all classes, nation alities, and sections of China, and was theoretically endowed with control over all legislative and executive powers of the state. In practice, however, it was the CCP-controlled central leadership of the NPC which ran the government. Since the formation of the NPC, the CPPC has been shunted aside and has no governmental functions. It met at the same time as the NPC, adding to the facade of democratic institutions, but was little more than a propaganda forum. The last NPC was held in 1964, and the leadership is now a year late in calling a new Congress. According to the Constitution, a fourth NPC should have been convened during 1968.
Communist Party Membership: Over 17 million in 1961; present membership unknown.
Leading Party Figures and Position:
MAO Tse-tung - Chairman, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee LIN Piao Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee CHOU En-lai- Premier and Member of Politburo Standing Committee
People's Daily (Jen-min Jih-pao) - Daily newspaper Red Flag (Hung Ch'i) Party theoretical journal.
Area of Communist Activity
Until the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the CCP's thorough penetration of every type of activity in China permitted no significant organized opposition or challenge. The large Party
membership, which apparently had increased steadily in the years before the Cultural Revolution (perhaps 90% of all party members joined the Party after the regime's establishment in 1949), allowed for adequate control and surveillance of a population that numbers an estimated 750 million.
Both the Party and the public security apparatus were severely weakened during the Cultural Revolution. Pending their complete rebuilding, political control and surveillance functions are the responsibility of local "revolutionary committees" and worker's provost corps operating under military supervision.
Before the Cultural Revolution the system of highly centralized Party authority had created serious problems for the Maoist leadership, which became greatly troubled that its own spirit of revolutionary dedi cation, doctrinaire confidence, and ideological fervor was not matched by party cadres, let alone the general population. A major purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to remedy this situation but the campaign does not appear to have had notable success in this area.
The leadership has consistently acknowledged a special relationship with the 2.5 million-strong People's Liberation Army (PLA), recognizing that it is a vital element in maintaining the regime. Party membership in the PLA was close to one million in the early 1960's, and dis-te charged veterans were an important source for replenishing civilian cadre ranks.
A dual effort has been made to modernize the PLA and to maintain its political reliability and its devotion to Mao's thought as the primary element in military readiness. Military ranks were abolished in May 1965 in a move apparently intended to curb "professionalist" (as opposed to political) tendencies. During the course of the Cultural Revolution, the Army has been charged variously with supporting the Red Guards, putting down disorders arising from factional disputes, and in many cases providing the administrative framework in areas where the normal Party and government apparatus has been damaged byns purges. At the same time, the PLA itself came under attack, and some high-ranking officers were purged; despite these difficulties, the Army has remained intact and basically loyal to the regime.
Although the Cultural Revolution has not yet been officially terminated, Communist China has entered a period of political rebuilding. Attention during 1969 has been directed chiefly toward rebuilding of the shattered Party structure. A long overdue national Party Congress, the ninth, convened early in the year chose a new top-level Party hierarchy and adopted a new Constitution.
In contrast to the 1956 Party Constitution, the constitution adopted by the Ninth Congress was a more ideological, exhortative document which provided only a bare outline of how the Party will be run. The new, shorter document did not so much add specific new powers to those already possessed by the center as to omit many old provisions, some of which described the role of Party organs at lower levels. It specifi cally required that the PLA accept Party leadership, a point left out of a new draft circulated in China during the fall of 1968. The change appeared intended to underline the point that Communist China is a Party-led Communist state and not a military-bureaucratic dictator ship as the Soviets had charged.
The Ninth Party Congress produced a new Politburo and Central Committee which clearly reflected the increased power of the military in mainland China. Nearly 40% of the new Central Committee are military men, as are 44% of the Politburo. However, the new Politburo Standing Committee included the same top five who had been running China during the Cultural Revolution: Mao, Minister of Defense Lin Piao, Premier Chou En-lai, ideologist Chen Po-ta, and security chief K'ang Sheng. Beneath them, the composition of the remaining top 20 Party leaders was somewhat altered. Economic planners Chen Yun and Li Fu-chun and Foreign Minister Chen Yi were dropped, although all showed up for the Congress and apparently retain high positions. Elevated were leaders with provincial power bases such as Hsu Shih-yu and Ch'en Hsi-lien (who head both Military Regions and Provincial Revolutionary Commit tees). The net effect of this shuffle was that the new Politburoh reflected more accurately the actual power situation in China.
Following the Party Congress, the leadership shifted its attention to the rebuilding of Party committees at the province level and below. During the three years of the Cultural Revolution these committees had been decimated and their functions largely taken over by local governing bodies known as "revolutionary committees," which were comprised of party members who survived the power struggle, members of mass organizations which emerged during the course of the struggle, and representatives of the military. Although the regime has stated its intention that the Party should once again exercise control over all other organs, control over local functions still remains predomi nantly in the hands of the largely military-dominated "revolutionary committees."
The political situation following the closing of the Ninth Party Congress in April indicated that other than confirming a new hierarchy, the Congress had resolved few problems. Economic plans still appeared indefinite; criminal activity and labor indiscipline continued to cause trouble; and factional fighting flared up in more than a dozen provinces during the summer of 1969, forcing Peking to crack down hard on dissidence. Although during the latter half of 1969 Peking media continued to stress Party building, and provincial radio broadcasts
announced the formation of a number of new Party committees at local levels, it was clear that given the lack of local political unity and the indiscipline that have been the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, the political rebuilding of the Party would move slowly.
A high degree of tension marked Sino-Soviet relations throughout 1969. Several border incidents were publicized by both sides, including two sharp engagements along the Ussuri River where China's northeastern frontier touches the Soviet Union. Foreign press reports indicated that the Soviets were engaged in a large-scale military buildup along the Sino-Soviet frontier. Rumors circulated that Moscow was consider ing some form of military action against the Chinese Communists and Peking responded by initiating a "war preparations" campaign which stressed internal vigilance against the Soviet threat.
A new trend in Sino-Soviet relations began on September 11 when Soviet Premier Kosygin met briefly with Chou En-lai in Peking. The Chou Kosygin meeting eventually led to border talks which began in Peking on October 20. Press reports suggested that the first two months of negotiations have brought little progress. As the year ended, the prospect was for protracted and difficult negotiations.
APPENDIX W VOTES ON COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE U.N.
[From: Issues in United States Foreign Policy. No.4 Communist China, ed. by John Kimball. Washington, Department of State, December 1969. (Publ.8499).]
The proponent agency of this pamphlet is the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements to Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Op erations, ATTN: OPS-IA-PM, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310.